

16 September 1985

New paragraph for DCID 1/14

11. Outside Activities

An individual contemplating employment or activities which could create a potential conflict of interest, real or apparent, with the individual's responsibility to protect classified information from unauthorized disclosure must report such intentions prior to becoming actively involved. This requirement applies to individuals who already are authorized access to SCI as well as to individuals who are aware that they are being considered for such access.

Information concerning intended or existing outside employment or activities shall be evaluated in accordance with the factors specified in Annex A to determine whether the circumstances raise the probability of an unauthorized disclosure to an unacceptable level.

Individuals being considered for SCI access approval shall be required to report their outside employment or activities (as defined in Annex A), intended or existing, on or with their completed personal history statements. Individuals holding SCI access approvals will report in writing to their cognizant security officer before beginning any intended outside employment or activities (as defined in Annex A).

Annex A to DCID 1/14

Add to the list of matters which must be scrutinized by adjudicators (p. 7 of the DCID): "Involvement in outside activities"

Add a new section at the end of Annex A (p. 11 of the DCID package) captioned: **"OUTSIDE ACTIVITIES"**

"Involvement in non-US Government or non-US Government contracted employment or activities which raise potential conflicts of interest, real or apparent, with an individual's responsibility to protect classified information is of security concern and must be evaluated to determine whether the conflict is of such nature that SCI access should be denied or revoked.

"Employment of concern includes service (whether or not compensated) with any foreign government or national, with a representative of any foreign interest, or with any foreign or domestic organization or person engaged in analysis, discussion or publication of material on intelligence, defense or foreign affairs.

"Activities of potential concern include close or continuing contact with foreign nationals; association with nationals of Communist countries or countries hostile to the United States; membership in organizations which have, as members, nationals of Communist countries or countries hostile to the United States when the membership involves frequent or significant contact with those nationals; and sponsorship of the entry of aliens into the United States.

"Adjudicators of new SCI access approvals shall carefully consider whether an individual's outside activities may pose a conflict of interest with his or her security responsibilities that could result in his or her consciously or accidentally disclosing to unauthorized persons classified

information. Any doubt as to an individual's willingness or ability to safeguard classified information shall be resolved by denying SCI access.

"In the case of individuals holding SCI access approvals, reports from the individuals or other sources concerning outside employment or activities of security concern shall be evaluated carefully by cognizant security officials to determine if SCI access should be continued. When an individual reports a new or changed outside employment or activity which is of security concern, he or she shall be advised that continued involvement in that employment or activity may result in withdrawal of SCI access, and be given an opportunity to disengage from that activity. If this results in the individual's terminating the outside activity of security concern, his or her SCI access approval(s) may be continued, provided that this is otherwise consistent with national security requirements and necessary for the performance of assigned duties."

Annex C to DCID 1/14 (or separate document superseding it)

Add the following:

All individuals nominated for or holding SCI access approval(s) shall be notified initially and not less than annually thereafter of their responsibility to report to their cognizant security officers outside employment or activities which could raise potential conflicts of interest, real or apparent, with their duty to protect classified information from disclosure to unauthorized persons. (DCID 1/14, Annex A, provides examples of outside employment or activities of security concern.) Individuals granted SCI access approvals shall be advised:

(1) whom they may consult to determine if particular outside employment or activity might be of security concern;

(2) of the need to exercise security caution in their activities as members of professional, commercial, scholarly or advocacy organizations that publish or discuss information on intelligence, defense or foreign affairs; and

(3) of their continuing obligation to submit for prepublication review any planned articles, books, speeches or public statements which concern intelligence matters.

## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) New Paragraph for DCID 1/14 Regarding Off-Duty Activities

FROM: <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 250px; height: 20px;"></span> Policy Branch/PPG <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 150px; height: 20px;"></span>	EXTENSION	NO.  DATE 27 September 1985
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TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		

1. C/OPS/PSI			
2. AC/SSD			
3. C/EAB			
4. C/SSC	2 Sep		Attached is the redrafted proposal of the new section of DCID 1/14 to provide guidance on off-duty activities of security concern as indicated in Tab A.
5.	Concur		Tab B describes SECOM activities regarding subject and requests that the draft be reviewed and comments provided.
6.			Please provide any comments or concurrence with the draft to Policy and Plans Group by c.o.b. 7 October 1985.
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13. ---WARNING NOTICE---			
14. INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED			
15.			

SIGNED

CONFIDENTIAL

# ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Revision of DCID 1/14 re Off-Duty Activities

FROM:

Policy Branch/PPG

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

18 July 1985

25X1

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

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COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. C/Policy Branch

2.

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6.

7. DD/S

8.

9. D/S

10.

11.

12.

13.

—WARNING NOTICE

14. INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED

15.

Attached is the response to SECOM regarding subject indicating concurrence with the proposed revision, with two exceptions as noted.

The document differs from Agency guidance in two areas:

- ° OS requires reporting "prior to" initiation of such activities, not "immediately after" as suggested in paragraph one.

- ° Prepublication review is clearly spelled out for those with access.

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/12/14 : CIA-RDP87B01034R000500130022-3